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Abstract:  The role of institutions in mediating the use of intellectual property rights 
has long been neglected in debates over the economics of intellectual property.  In a 
path-breaking work, Rob Merges studied what he calls "collective rights 
organizations," industry groups that collect intellectual property rights from owners 
and license them as a package. Merges finds that these organizations ease some of 
the tensions created by strong intellectual property rights by allowing industries to 
bargain from a property rule into a liability rule. Collective rights organizations thus 
play a valuable role in facilitating transactions in intellectual property rights. 
  
There is another sort of organization that mediates between intellectual property 
owners and users, however.  Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) regularly 
encounter situations in which one or more companies claim to own proprietary rights 
that cover a proposed industry standard.  The industry cannot adopt the standard 
without the permission of the intellectual property owner (or owners).   
  
How SSOs respond to those who assert intellectual property rights is critically 
important.  Whether or not private companies retain intellectual property rights in 
group standards will determine whether a standard is "open" or "closed."  It will 
determine who can sell compliant products, and it may well influence whether the 
standard adopted in the market is one chosen by a group or one offered by a single 
company.  SSO rules governing intellectual property rights will also affect how 
standards change as technology improves.  To give just one example, the Internet 
runs on a set of open, non-proprietary protocols in large part because the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the SSO that controls the TCP and IP protocols, had 
a long-standing policy that it would not adopt proprietary standards.  That policy has 
now changed; it remains to be seen whether the open nature of the Internet will 
change with it.  But in any event, the magnitude of the stakes should be clear.   
  
Given the importance of SSO rules governing intellectual property rights, there has 
been surprisingly little treatment of SSOs or their intellectual property rules in the 
legal literature. My aim in this article is to fill that void.  To do so, I have surveyed 
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the intellectual property policies of dozens of SSOs, primarily but not exclusively in 
the computer networking and telecommunications industries.  In Part I, I provide 
some background on SSOs themselves, and discuss the value of group standard 
setting in network markets.  In Part II, I discuss my empirical research, which 
demonstrates a remarkable diversity among SSOs in how they treat intellectual 
property.  In Part III, I consider the constraints the antitrust laws place on SSOs in 
general, and on their adoption of intellectual property policies in particular.  In Part 
IV, I analyze a host of unresolved legal issues relating to the applicability and 
enforcement of such intellectual property policies.  Finally, in Part V I offer 
recommendations to scholars, policy-makers, companies, and SSOs for dealing with 
SSO intellectual property policies. 
  
In the end, I hope to convince the reader of four things.  First, SSO rules governing 
intellectual property fundamentally change the way in which we must approach the 
study of intellectual property.  It is not enough to consider IP rights in a vacuum; we 
must consider them as they are actually used in practice.  And that means 
considering how SSO rules affect IP incentives.  Second, there is a remarkable 
diversity among SSOs in how they treat IP rights.  This diversity is largely 
accidental, and does not reflect conscious competition between different policies.  
Third, antitrust law is not well designed to take account of the modern role of SSOs.  
Antitrust rules may unduly restrict SSOs even when those organizations are serving 
procompetitive ends.  Fourth, the enforcement of SSO IP rules presents a number of 
important but unresolved problems of contract and intellectual property law.  I offer 
some suggestions for how to think about these problems in the final part of this 
paper. 
 
 
he standard economic theory of intellectual property is well known.  Intellectual creations are public 
goods, much easier and cheaper to copy than they are to produce in the first place.  Absent some form of 
exclusive right over inventions, no one (or not enough people) will bother to innovate.  Intellectual 
property rights are thus a "solution" to the public goods problem because they privatize the public good, and 
therefore give potential inventors an incentive to engage in research and development.3 
 In the real world, things aren't so simple.  People innovate for lots of reasons, and the existence of 
intellectual property rights doesn't appear to be chief among them.4  Intellectual property rights have different 
impact on different industries, depending on the nature and cost of innovation, the maturity of the industry, and 
the relationship between patentable inventions and marketable products.  These different characteristics, 
coupled with uncertainty about how much incentive intellectual property rights actually give, lead to vigorous 
debates about the wisdom of intellectual property rights in particular contexts, notably software and electronic 
commerce.5 
 The role of institutions in mediating the use of intellectual property rights has long been neglected in 
these debates.  In a path-breaking work, Rob Merges studied what he calls "collective rights organizations," 
industry groups that collect intellectual property rights from owners and license them as a package.6  Merges 
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finds that these organizations ease some of the tensions created by strong intellectual property rights by 
allowing industries to bargain from a property rule into a liability rule.7  Collective rights organizations thus 
play a valuable role in facilitating transactions in intellectual property rights. 
 There is another sort of organization that mediates between intellectual property owners and users, 
however.  Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) regularly encounter situations in which one or more 
companies claim to own proprietary rights that cover a proposed industry standard.  The industry cannot adopt 
the standard without the permission of the intellectual property owner (or owners).   
 How SSOs respond to those who assert intellectual property rights is critically important.  Whether or 
not private companies retain intellectual property rights in group standards will determine whether a standard is 
"open" or "closed."  It will determine who can sell compliant products, and it may well influence whether the 
standard adopted in the market is one chosen by a group or one offered by a single company.  SSO rules 
governing intellectual property rights will also affect how standards change as technology improves.  To give 
just one example, the Internet runs on a set of open, non-proprietary protocols in large part because the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the SSO that controls the TCP and IP protocols, had a long-standing policy 
that it would not adopt proprietary standards.  That policy has now changed; it remains to be seen whether the 
open nature of the Internet will change with it.  But in any event, the magnitude of the stakes should be clear.   
 Given the importance of SSO rules governing intellectual property rights, there has been surprisingly 
little treatment of SSOs or their intellectual property rules in the legal literature.8  My aim in this article is to fill 
that void.  To do so, I have surveyed the intellectual property policies of dozens of SSOs, primarily but not 
exclusively in the computer networking and telecommunications industries.  In Part I, I provide some 
background on SSOs themselves, and discuss the value of group standard setting in network markets.  In Part 
II, I discuss my empirical research, which demonstrates a remarkable diversity among SSOs in how they treat 
intellectual property.  In Part III, I consider the constraints the antitrust laws place on SSOs in general, and on 
their adoption of intellectual property policies in particular.  In Part IV, I analyze a host of unresolved legal 
issues relating to the applicability and enforcement of such intellectual property policies.  Finally, in Part V I 
offer recommendations to scholars, policy-makers, companies, and SSOs for dealing with SSO intellectual 
property policies. 
 In the end, I hope to convince the reader of four things.  First, SSO rules governing intellectual 
property fundamentally change the way in which we must approach the study of intellectual property.  It is not 
enough to consider IP rights in a vacuum; we must consider them as they are actually used in practice.  And 
that means considering how SSO rules affect IP incentives.  Second, there is a remarkable diversity among 
SSOs in how they treat IP rights.  This diversity is largely accidental, and does not reflect conscious 
competition between different policies.  Third, antitrust law is not well designed to take account of the modern 
role of SSOs.  Antitrust rules may unduly restrict SSOs even when those organizations are serving 
procompetitive ends.  Fourth, the enforcement of SSO IP rules presents a number of important but unresolved 
problems of contract and intellectual property law.  I offer some suggestions for how to think about these 
problems in the final part of this paper. 
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I. The Nature and Importance of Standard Setting Organizations 
 
A.  The Value of Standardization 
 Standards (and standard-setting organizations) come in a variety of forms.  I define a standard rather 
broadly, as any set of technical specifications which either does or is intended to provide a common design for 
a product or process.  Some standards are extremely complex and technical in nature.  For example, the set of 
applications programming interfaces that defines compatibility with the Microsoft Windows operating system 
is an industry standard; those who know and use the proper interfaces are compliant with the standard, and their 
products will "interoperate" with the Microsoft OS. But standards do not have to be so sophisticated.  Ordinary 
consumers use a wide variety of standardized products in everyday life.  In the U.S., electrical plugs and outlets 
are built to a particular standard for voltage, impedance, and plug shape.  Without this standardization, no one 
could stay in a hotel room and have any confidence that their hair dryer would work in the hotel's outlet.  The 
modern economy has also standardized telephone service, computer modem communication protocols, 
automobile ignition and transmission systems, and countless other products. 
 As these examples attest, in many markets standardization has significant consumer benefits.  This is 
especially true in so-called "network markets," where the value of a product to a particular consumer is a 
function of how many other consumers use the same (or a compatible) product.9  The paradigm example is the 
telephone network, in which the value of the product is entirely driven by the number of other people on the 
same network.  Still other products -- like computer operating systems -- have some intrinsic value regardless 
of how many people use them, but gain value as more and more consumers adopt them.  In these industries, 
consumers benefit from standardization not only because they can reliably use their product in a remote 
location, but also because they can exchange information with others who use the same standard.  Further, 
markets for complementary products will often gear their production to work with a product that is an industry 
standard, rather than a product that has only a small market share.  For example, software vendors are more 
likely to write computer applications programs compatible with Microsoft's operating system than with other 
operating systems, because there are more consumers for such a product.  This in turn reinforces the desire of 
consumers to buy the product everyone else buys, a phenomenon known as "tipping."10 
 In network markets, then, standardization may well be inevitable, and certainly carries substantial 
consumer benefits.  Even in non-network markets, standard-setting can have a variety of procompetitive and 
other beneficial effects.  Agreeing on a set of standards can facilitate a competitive market for replacement 
parts or service in durable goods industries, for example.  Further, in many industries standards may be 
valuable for reasons unrelated to or even inimical to competition.  Construction products must meet industry 
standards for fire resistance, for example, and doctors, lawyers and many other professionals must meet 
minimum licensing standards.  These latter standards are not procompetitive in the narrow sense of encouraging 
price competition; indeed, they may have the opposite effect.  But standards of this type can still promote social 
welfare by ensuring that imperfect information does not lead consumers to buy dangerous products or hire 
unqualified doctors simply because they cost less.11 
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     Because it does not directly concern intellectual property cases, resolution of this debate is outside the scope of this 
article. 
 On the other hand, standardization also poses some potential threats to competition.  Absent network 
effects, economists generally presume that consumers fare best when many companies compete to offer 
different sorts of products.  To the extent that standardization on a single product reduces consumer choice, it 
may be undesirable.  Of course, if a market is truly competitive, unnecessary standardization should eventually 
be competed away by new entrants offering different sorts of products.  But standard-setting organizations may 
be able to impede such competition, in effect acting as a cartel with the power to exclude output.12  The general 
nature of this problem is discussed in more detail below.13 
 
B.  The Benefits of Group Standard-Setting 
 It remains, however, to consider the organizational form standardization may take. One approach to 
achieving interoperable standards is for a private industry organization open to all members to adopt a single 
standard. If the members of such a group collectively have a significant market share, their adoption of a 
standard may produce the “tipping” effect described above, bringing the rest of the industry into line.14  
Not all standards are created by private standard-setting organizations, however.  Two other 
organizational forms are worth considering.  First, a standard may arise from the operation of the market, as 
consumers gravitate towards a single product or protocol and reject its competitors.  This form of “de facto” 
standardization is particularly likely in markets characterized by strong network effects, because of the large 
benefits associated with adopting the same product everyone else does.  To take just one example, the 
Microsoft operating systems are clearly de facto standards.  No standard-setting organization “adopted” them as 
the preferred or official operating systems, but the market clearly chose Microsoft as the winner of a standards 
competition. 
Another possibility is that the government might identify and set the appropriate standards and compel 
all participants in the market to comply. The government does this from time to time. For example, the Federal 
Communications Commission sets standards for interconnection between telephone networks and standards 
governing the use of products that might interfere with broadcast communications.15 In the 1990s, the United 
States government stepped into the debate over the proper standard for high definition television (HDTV), 
selecting a standard that unified U.S. development work but was at odds with other standards adopted in Japan 
and Europe.16 And government agencies such as the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National 
Science Foundation played a crucial role in the development of the Internet, including the creation of Internet 
interconnection protocols. Indeed, some private Internet standard-setting groups such as InterNIC and the IETF 
were once government-sponsored standards organizations.  
 In this article I shall primarily be concerned with the activities of private standard-setting 
organizations.  While de facto standards do raise significant antitrust issues relating to intellectual property, 
they are analytically distinct from the ones I discuss here.17  Generally speaking, a de facto standard will be 
proprietary unless the standard-setter chooses to release it to the public.  Government-set standards also present 
a very different set of issues, in part because of the state action and petitioning immunity doctrines.18  
 
C.  Relationship to Intellectual Property 
 Briefly stated, the issues in this article arise when a standard-setting organization adopts (or fails to 
adopt) a standard that is covered in whole or in part by an intellectual property right, generally but not 
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necessarily an intellectual property right owned by a party that has some dealings with the organization.19  
These issues arise in three basic ways.  First, a party upset with the decision to adopt (or not to adopt) a 
standard may challenge that decision as anticompetitive.  In the intellectual property context, these claims are 
either by third parties against a standard-setting organization that has adopted a proprietary standard, or by 
patentees upset that a standard-setting organization has not adopted their proprietary standard.  Second, a 
defendant may be charged with manipulating the standard-setting process, normally in order to gain adoption of 
a proprietary technology but conceivably in order to prevent its adoption.  Finally, standard-setting 
organizations frequently use formal or informal mechanisms such as rules governing the ownership of 
intellectual property or joint defense arrangements to lessen the control an intellectual property owner has over 
a standard they adopt.  These arrangements may themselves be challenged as anticompetitive.  Because this last 
sort of agreement is of particular importance to intellectual property as well as antitrust policy, I discuss these 
policies in much more detail in Part II. 
 
 
II. How Standard Setting Organizations Treat Intellectual Property Rights 
 
A.  Organizations Studied 
To see how standard-setting organizations treat intellectual property rights, I surveyed the rules and 
by-laws of 29 different standard-setting organizations.  The organizations I chose were ones likely to be 
encountered by companies in the telecommunications and computer networking industries, where many of the 
most contentious intellectual property issues arise.  They include both large national or international groups 
such as ANSI (the American National Standards Institute) and the ISO (the International Organization for 
Standardization), as well as smaller groups centered within the industries themselves.  However, the collection 
of organizations here is by no means comprehensive, even within the telecommunications and computer 
networking industries. 
I sought to identify several pieces of information with respect to an organization’s policy on 
intellectual property rights.  The first question was whether the organization had any policy at all regarding 
intellectual property.  If they did, I then sought to determine whether the policy covered only patents, or 
whether it covered other forms of IP rights as well.   
For those organizations that had policies governing IP, I sought to categorize the policy according to 
several factors.  First, I determined whether the policy required disclosure of an IP right (as well as certain 
subsidiary questions, such as the nature of the search obligation (if any) and whether disclosure extended to 
pending as well as issued patents).  Second, I determined the effect of an IP disclosure on the standard-setting 
process under the policy: chiefly whether the organization would refuse to adopt a standard covered by a patent.  
Finally, I determined whether the organization imposed a licensing requirement on intellectual property owners, 
and if so the nature of that requirement. 
 
B.  Results 
1.  Summary of Organization Policies 
The full data from this survey are reprinted in Table 1 at the end of this article.   
What is most striking about this data is the significant variation in policies among the different 
organizations.  Of the 29 organizations I studied, 21 have written policies governing the ownership of 
intellectual property rights, 7 have no policy,20 and one has a policy that was still in development.  Most groups 
without a policy are small, industry-specific groups; all of the large standard-setting organizations I studied 
have well-developed policies in this area.   
 The subject matter of those policies varies significantly from group to group.  Virtually all groups have 
either an express or implied obligation that members disclose intellectual property rights of which they were 
aware.  Those groups that do not require disclosure generally impose other conditions that obviated the need for 
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disclosure.  Most commonly, they require royalty-free licensing of all member intellectual property rights that 
cover a group standard, whether or not it was disclosed to the organization.21   
There is greater variation, however, with respect to what must be disclosed.  While virtually all the 
policies I studied cover patents, a significant minority also cover copyright and trademark rights, or refer 
globally to “intellectual property rights” subject to the policy.  Where patents are concerned, most organizations 
consider only issued patents.  There is rarely discussion of the problem of pending patent applications.22  A few 
organizations consider the issue, but do not require the disclosure of pending applications, which are ordinarily 
kept confidential.  Two organizations, the ITU and OSGi, require disclosure of all pending patent applications.  
Two other organizations have an intermediate policy.  The ATM Forum requires disclosure of published patent 
applications, but not unpublished ones.23  And the WAP Forum requires disclosure even of unpublished patent 
applications, but only from a member who is also the proponent of a standard.   
Curiously, virtually none of the organization rules I studied require a member to search either its own 
files or the broader literature to identify relevant intellectual property rights.  Only three groups – the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, and the Frame 
Relay Forum – required such a search.  ETSI’s requirement is subject to waiver; it provides that either ETSI or 
the member will be required to conduct a search.  Only the Frame Relay Forum specifies the sort of search that 
must be conducted, and even that is done in broad terms (a “reasonable” search).  The failure of organizations 
to require searches, while understandable given the time and resource constraints under which members 
operate, gives rise to serious problems, as I discuss below.24 
Most organizations permit members to own intellectual property rights in a standard, though they often 
discourage it.  Only RosettaNet, which requires members to assign their intellectual property rights to the 
group, appears to flatly prohibit ownership of IP rights.  Other groups discourage ownership of intellectual 
property without actually forbidding it, however.  Thus, two groups studied (I2O SIG and Wired for 
Management) permit a member of own intellectual property, but only if they will license it to other members on 
a royalty-free basis.  ISO requires members to give up patent rights, though not other sorts of IP rights.  ETSI 
will reconsider its decision to approve a standard if the standard turns out to be controlled by an intellectual 
property right.  The ATM Forum requires a ¾ majority to approve a standard governed by an intellectual 
property right, and similarly makes it easier to revoke a standard if it is found to be covered by intellectual 
property.  Several organizations expressly discourage the ownership of intellectual property in standards, but 
will permit them in exceptional cases.25  And at least one organization (the WAP Forum) appears to take 
inconsistent positions on the ownership of intellectual property. 
Even those groups that permit members to own intellectual property rights covering a standard 
generally impose some conditions on the use of that intellectual property.  The most common condition is that 
intellectual property rights be licensed on “reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms”; 14 of the 21 organizations 
with policies required members to license their patent rights on such terms.  Another organization required 
outright assignment of patent rights, and two more required royalty-free licensing of patents.26  Three 
organizations have a looser standard, requesting that members agree to license their patents on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms, but not requiring that they do so. 
While “reasonable and nondiscriminatory licensing” thus appears to be the majority rule among 
organizations with a patent policy, relatively few organizations give much explanation of what those terms 
mean or how licensing disputes will be resolved.  Only two organizations specifically provide that the licensing 
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obligation compels a member to license to everyone in the world using the standard, not just to license to other 
members.  It seems unlikely that the remaining organizations intend to restrict the licensing obligation;27 rather, 
it appears they simply haven’t addressed the issue in their policies.  Four organizations either give content to 
the obligation by specifying what a “reasonable” term means, or provide a mechanism for the organization to 
resolve disputes about license terms and fees.  And one organization requires not only that a license term be 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory, but also that it not constitute “monopolistic abuse” of a patent.  In short, 
while intellectual property owners at many organizations must license their rights on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms, it is not clear what those obligations mean in practice. 
  
2.  Implications of Diversity 
 The fact that different organizations have different rules governing intellectual property rights (or no 
rules at all) means that it is very difficult for intellectual property owners to know ex ante what rules will 
govern their rights.  Because there is no standard set of rules, companies must investigate the by-laws of each 
organization they join in order to understand the implications of joining.  While this doesn’t seem that onerous 
a burden in the abstract, a number of practical considerations mean that companies are unlikely to be fully 
informed about their intellectual property position.   
 First, most companies in technology industries participate in more than one standard-setting 
organization.  To take just one example, in 1998 Sun Microsystems participated in 87 different standards 
groups.28   
 
Figure 1.  Standards Organization List by Function  
 
General     Communications and Networking, Cont.   
  Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X3  Information Infrastructure Standards Panel (IISP) 
   ANSI   Network Management Forum (NMF)   
  ECMA   World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)   
  IEEE/POSIX        
  International Organization for Standardization  Desktop and Graphics     
  (ISO)   Component Integration Laboratories (CIL) 
  International Telecommunication Union (ITU)  Desktop Management Task Force (DMTF) 
  ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC1)  International Color Consortium (ICC)   
  Open Group   Interactive Multimedia Association (IMA) 
  Open Software Foundation (OSF)  Moving Pictures Experts Group (MPEG) 
  X/Open   Multimedia and Hypermedia Information Coding  
  X3        Experts Group (MHEG)   
     Open GL     
OS and Architecture-Specific   X Consortium    
  ABI groups        
  Large File Summit  US Government and Other Nations    
  Power PC Group   Asia Oceanic Workshop (AOW)   
  SPARC International   Chinese Open Systems Association (COSA) 
  Unicode Consortium   Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
  UNIX International   DoD Specifications and Standards   
     European Commission DGXIII/E Open    
Communications and Networking   Information Interchange (OII) Initiative 
  Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Forum  European Workshop for Open Systems (EWOS) 
  CommerceNet   Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 
  Financial Services Technology Consortium   Japanese Industrial Standards Committee (JISC) 
                (FSTC)   National Institute of Standards & Technology 
  Frame Relay Forum (FRF)   (NIST)    
  Internet Society   Open Systems Environment Implementors  
  Internet Engineering Tax Force (IETF)  Workshop (OIW)    
  Internet RFC’s             
                                                 
27   Such a restriction would pose serious antitrust concerns.  See infra __. 
28   See Figure 1.  This list courtesy of Erv Basinski. 
Figure 1, cont.  Standards Organization List by Function 
 
Application   Other Standards Groups     
  ANSA   Association of Information and Image    
  Electronic Data Interchange Association (EDIA)       Management International (AIIM) – see DMA 
  Electronic Messaging Association (EMA)  CAD Framework Initiative (CFI)   
  Information Technology Association of America  Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP) 
  (ITAA)   Data Management Interfaces Group (DMIG) 
  Open GIS Consortium (OGC)   Data Interchange Standards Association, Inc. 
  Open User Recommended Solutions (OURS)  (DISA)    
  Petrotechnical Open Software Corporation   Digital Audio Visual Council (DAVIC)   
  (POSC)   Document Enabled Networking (DEN) – see 
  SQL Access Group – see X/Open  DMA    
  UniForum Association   International Multimedia Teleconferencing 
Testing & Performance   Consortium (IMTC)   
  Corporation for Open Systems (COS)   Message Oriented Middleware Association 
  Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation   (MOMA)    
  (SPEC)   National Information Standards Organization  
     (NISO)    
Documentation   PEX     
  Davenport Group   QIC [tape cartridges]    
  Document Management Alliance (DMA)  Shamrock Group – see DMA   
  JTCI SC18/WG8   SPAG     
  SGML/Open   Telecommunications Information Networking  
     Architecture Consortium (TINA-C) 
Hardware    Transaction Processing Performance Council  
  Electronic Industries Association (EIA)  (TPC)    
  Open Firmware Working Group   Uniform Device Driver Interface Group (formerly 
  PCMCIA   CDDI)    
  Plug and Play Association   Workflow Mangement Coalition   
  Rockridge Group   X.400 API Association (XAPIA)   
  Video and Electronics Standards Association   Z39.50 Information Retrieval Service and  
  (VESA)   Protocol Standard    
  VMEbus International Trade Association (VITA)       
          
Objects         
  Object Database Management Group (ODMG)       
  Object Management Group (OMG)             
 
 
 
 Similarly, there are dozens of different groups associated with Internet technical standards alone.29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29   See Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  Roadmap to the Communities and Parties of the Internet.30 
 
 
 
 
Thus, technology companies don’t merely have to figure out what rules apply to them, but they face a labyrinth 
of different groups with overlapping subject matter concerns, each with its own set of rules.  Because standard-
setting organizations are concerned only with intellectual property rights that affect their particular standards, 
the likely result will be that some of a company’s intellectual property rights will be subject to effective 
forfeiture, more will be subject to disclosure and licensing requirements, and some will not be restricted.  
Lawyers would have to examine each group, each standard, and each patent carefully to know for sure which is 
which. 
 This brings us to the second practical problem.  Lawyers are rarely the ones to participate in standard-
setting meetings.  A company’s representative to such a group is likely to be an engineer with little or no 
understanding of patent law.  Indeed, in many cases the decision whether or not to join an organization is made 
at a fairly low level within a company, without the involvement of senior businesspeople, much less lawyers.  If 
the organization in question is one of the few that compels assignment or royalty-free licensing, or requires a 
search for intellectual property, the decision to join may inadvertently commit the company to give up major 
intellectual property rights. 
 Because of these practical limitations, most technology companies today face a hodgepodge of rules 
and obligations of which they are only dimly aware.  In the sections that follow, I explore some of the legal 
rules that bear on standard-setting organizations, identify some of the problems that arise in articulating and 
enforcing intellectual property policies, and offer some suggestions to all the players involved (members, 
organizations, courts, and scholars) for how to think about the intellectual property rules of standard-setting 
organizations. 
 
 
                                                 
30   Taken from http://www.wia.org/roadmap.htm. 
 
Table 1.30  SSO Intellectual Property Rules 
 
SSO Policy? Disclosure? Search? Can Standard 
Include IP? 
Licensing 
Provisions 
W3C31 P,TM,© Yes No Yes RAND requested but 
not required 
I2O SIG32 P, TM No No Yes33 royalty-free license 
required 
Wired for Management34 P No No Yes35 royalty-free license 
required for 
necessary claims 
only 
IETF36 P,© Yes No Yes37 RAND to all users; 
terms must be 
specified 
IEEE38 P Yes No Yes RAND; terms must 
be specified 
RosettaNet P,© No No No39 patents assigned to 
RosettaNet 
IMC40 None     
OMG41 all IP Yes No Yes RAND 
ISC42 None     
ITU43 P Yes; includes 
pending patents 
No Yes RAND; no 
“monpolistic abuse” 
ISO44 P,TM,© Yes No TM and © yes; 
patent no 
patents must be given 
up or RAND 
required; 
nonexclusive 
copyright license to 
ISO; no trademark 
rule 
FSTC45 None     
NIST46 P Yes Yes Yes incorporates ANSI 
rules 
ANSI47 P Yes No Maybe48 RAND; ANSI will 
review claims of 
unreasonableness 
ETSI49 P, utility 
model, 
designs 
Yes Depends50 Maybe51 RAND; irrevocable; 
but standard may be 
adopted even if 
patentee refuses to 
license 
BSI52 P No No Yes users licensed as of 
right; British patent 
office to settle 
disputes as to terms53 
ATM Forum P,TM,© Yes; includes 
only published 
applications 
No Yes54 royalty-free license 
as to copyrights; 
RAND licensing of 
patents or a written 
refusal to do so 
CEN/CENELEC P Yes No Maybe55 RAND to entire 
world required or 
standard is 
withdrawn 
Parlay Group None     
OGC None     
WAP Forum P,© Yes; includes 
some pending 
apps56 
No Unclear57 RAND required; 
possible public 
domain dedication 
 
Table 1, cont.58  SSO Intellectual Property Rules 
 
SSO Policy? Disclosure? Search? Can Standard 
Include IP? 
Licensing 
Provisions 
DMTF59 P No No Yes RAND required or 
standard is 
withdrawn 
MWIF60 all IP Yes No Yes royalty free license 
or RAND 
automatically 
compelled 
OSGi61 all IP Yes, including 
pending claims 
No Yes RAND required by 
agreement to join 
group 
Open Group62 P,© Yes De facto63 Yes © must be licensed 
royalty-free; RAND 
for patents 
CommerceNet None     
Frame Relay Forum P Yes; standards 
may be revoked 
for non-
disclosure 
“Reason-
able” 
search 
required 
Yes RAND 
AMI264 None     
JEITA65 In 
progress66 
 
    
 
 
                                                 
30   In this table, P means patent, TM means trademark, © means copyright, RAND means “reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory licensing” 
31   World Wide Web Consortium.  See http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/ 
32   Intelligent Input/Output Specification 
33   Subject to the royalty-free license. 
34   http://developer.intel.com/ial/wfm/wfmspecs.htm 
35   Subject to the royalty-free license. 
36   Internet Engineering Task Force.  See RFC 1958, § 5.1; http://www.ietf.org/ipr.html.  Some groups (such as the 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) adopt the IETF standards. 
37   See id. (“prefer unpatented technology, but if the best technology is patented and is available to all at reasonable terms, 
then incorporation of patented technology is acceptable.”). 
38   Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 
39   All intellectual property rights covered in a RosettaNet standard become the property of RosettaNet.  Cargill email § 13. 
40   Internet Mail Consortium 
41   Object Management Group; http://www.omg.org 
42   Internet Software Consortium, http://www.isc.org 
43   International Telecommunications Union; http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/patent/Readme.html 
44   International Organization for Standardization; http://www.iso.ch.  For a detailed discussion of the ISO standard-setting 
process, see Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a 
Proprietary Standard, 43 Antitrust Bull. 715 (1998).  A number of smaller groups (such as the UNICODE Consortium) 
explicitly adopt ISO/IEC rules. 
45   Financial Services Technology Consortium; http://www.fstc.org 
46   National Institute of Standards and Technology; http://www.nist.gov 
47   American National Standards Institute; for a discussion of the ANSI policy, see Robert P. Feldman & Maura L. Rees, 
The Effect of Industry Standard Setting on Patent Licensing and Enforcement, IEEE Communications, July 2000, at 112, 
113.  A number of smaller technical groups (VITA Standards Organization covering the VME Bus standard) explicitly 
adopt the ANSI approach.   
48   ANSI permits patented standards only if “technical reasons justify this approach.”  ANSI, Procedures for the 
Development and Coordination of American National Standards, §1.2.11.1. 
49   European Telecommunications Standards Institute.  For a discussion of ETSI policy, see Johan Verbruggen & Anna 
                                                                                                                                                       
Lorincz, Patents and Technical Standards §3.1.B (working paper 2001). 
50   EC policy requires that the patent owner conduct a search unless the standard-setting body commits to do the search 
itself.  See European Commission, Communication on IPRs, ¶¶4.5.1, 4.5.2. 
51   ETSI policy provides that the General Assembly shall refer cases of patent ownership to the EC and EFTA “for their 
consideration” if the patentee refuses to license on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.  Id at 15. 
52   British Standards Institute.  See Verbruggen & Lorincz, supra note __, at 16. 
53   This is pursuant to the U.K. Patent Act of 1977, § 46. 
54   If the patentee has refused to grant a license to patents covering a proposed standard on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms, a ¾ vote of the membership is required to approve the standard. If the standard has already been 
issued when the problem arises, 1/3 of the members may vote to revoke the standard.  ATM Forum Bylaws, Article 
3.12.2.d.  
55   A standard may include patented technology “in exceptional cases” only.  CEN/CENELEC Memorandum No. 8, 
Standardization and Intellectual Property Rights § 1 (1992).   
56   Proponents of a standard must notify WAP when an application is filed; other members need not do so, but if intellectual 
property is put into a standard it is “in public domain” and should not be subsequently patented.  Cargill email ¶5. 
57   On the one hand the WAP Forum standard says intellectual property included in a standard that is accepted is “in the 
public domain,” but on the other hand it also speaks of licensing on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.  Id. 
58   In this table, P means patent, TM means trademark, © means copyright, RAND means “reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory licensing” 
59   Distributed Management Task Force.  See Cargill email ¶6. 
60   Mobile Wireless Internet Forum.  See Cargill email ¶14. 
61   Open Services Gateway Initiative.  See Cargill email ¶16. 
62   http://archive.opengroup.org/itdialtone/architecture/procedures/iac.htm. 
63   While the Open Group rules do not require a search, they do require patentees to agree not to sue users of the standard 
for any patents that were not disclosed during the process.  This has an effect analogous to a search requirement. 
64   Advanced Memory Int’l, Inc., http://www.ami2.org/ 
65   Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association. http://www.eiaj.or.jp/english/index.htm. 
66   Site viewed Jan. 9, 2001. 
